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The concern about illicit capital flows from developing countries reflects a variety of relevant 
policy issues, but is often motivated by weakly formulated underlying analytical frameworks. 
We review the literature on illicit capital flows and suggest that the common underlying concern 
that motivates the different approaches is the identification of flows that potentially damage 
economic development. Implicitly, if these flows could be blocked, the result would be an 
improvement in social outcomes. Illicit flows can be illegal, but they need not be if the legal 
framework does not reflect social interests or does not cover the relevant flows. A minimal 
definition of an illicit capital flow has to consider both the direct and the indirect effects of the 
flow and has to assess these effects in the context of the specific political settlement of the 
country in question. To demonstrate the implications in simplified form, we distinguish among 
advanced countries, intermediate developers, and fragile developing countries. The types of 
flows that would be considered illicit are shown to be significantly different in each of these 
cases. The analysis provides a rigorous way of identifying policy-relevant illicit flows in 
developing countries. Given the potential importance of these flows, it is vital to have a rigorous 
framework that at least ensures that we minimize the chances of causing inadvertent damage 
through well-intentioned policies. Indeed, the analysis shows that many loose definitions of illicit 
capital flows are problematic in this sense. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of illicit capital flows has come to prominence relatively recently, reflecting 
growing concerns about the ramifications of an insufficiently regulated and apparently 
increasingly predatory international financial system. In advanced economies, the 2008 global 
financial crisis brought into sharp relief the growing gap between the effectiveness of national 
regulatory tools and the global operations of private financial agencies. As illustrated, for 
example, by the standoff between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Goldman 
Sachs employees over the collateralized debt obligation deal, Abacus 2007-AC 1, the debate in 
advanced countries has highlighted important ambiguities about what constitutes legitimate 
financial market behavior. 
 
In the case of developing countries, the international concern about illicit capital flows is 
motivated primarily by concerns that vital developmental resources are being lost to these 
economies because of the ease with which capital flight can flourish in the context of a 
burgeoning, yet opaque international financial system (for example, see Eurodad 2008a; Global 
Witness 2009; Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008; Baker 2005). Closely related to this is the idea 
that illicit capital flows from developing economies are indicative of deeper structural problems 
of political governance in these countries. Finally, there also are worries about how illicit capital 
flows from developing countries may affect advanced countries through diverse mechanisms, 
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such as directly or indirectly financing crime or terror. In this chapter, we are concerned mainly 
with the impact of illicit capital flows on developing countries and the effectiveness of policy to 
control such outflows. 
 
The next section situates the literature on illicit capital flows within the wider context of 
economic analyses of capital flight from developing economies and provides our definitions. The 
following section elaborates our definition of illicit capital flows. We simplify the range of 
variation across countries using a three-tier typology of different economic and political 
contexts: advanced economies, an intermediate group of normal developing countries in which a 
stable political settlement exists even though institutions still have a large element of informality, 
and a final tier of fragile and vulnerable developing countries in which the political settlement is 
collapsing, and economic processes, including illicit capital flight, are driven by the collapsing 
polity. A definition of illicit capital flight has to be consistently applicable across these 
substantially different institutional and political contexts. Keeping this in mind, we define illicit 
capital flows as flows that imply economic damage for a society given its existing economic and 
political structure. The penultimate section develops some basic policy tools to operationalize 
this analytical framework. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Illicit Capital Flows and Capital Flight: Concepts and Definitions 
 
The term illicit has strong moral undertones, but a closer look at the actual use of the term almost 
always reveals an underlying concern with the developmental damage that particular capital 
flows can inflict. We believe that, from a policy perspective, this has to be made explicit, as well 
as the precise methodology that is being applied to determine the damage. We start by defining 
an illicit capital flow as a flow that has a negative impact on an economy if all direct and indirect 
effects in the context of the specific political economy of the society are taken into account. 
Direct effects refer to the immediate impact of a particular illicit capital flow on a country’s 
economic growth performance, for example through reduced private domestic investment or 
adverse effects on tax revenue and public investment. Indirect effects are feedback effects on 
economic growth that arise from the role played by illicit capital flows in the sustainability of the 
social and political structure and dynamics of a country. For clarity of exposition, we specify the 
political economy of a society in terms of the political settlement. A political settlement is a 
reproducible structure of formal and informal institutions with an associated distribution of 
benefits that reflects a sustainable distribution of power. Sustainability requires that the formal 
and informal institutional arrangements that govern societal interaction in a country and the 
distribution of benefits to which they give rise achieve a sufficient degree of compatibility 
between economic productivity and political stability to allow the society to reproduce itself 
without an escalation of conflict (Khan 2010). 
 
There are two important elements in this definition. First, the judgment of impact has to consider 
both direct and indirect effects because we are interested in the overall net effect of particular 
financial flows on the developmental prospects of a country. Second, the specific political 
settlement of the country is important because the indirect effects, in particular, depend on the 
interplay between the economic and political structure of the country, and this can vary greatly 
across contexts. To simplify, we focus on three broad variants of political settlements, but finer 
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distinctions can be made. The assessment of both direct and indirect effects is necessarily based 
on a counterfactual assessment of what would happen if the illicit capital flow in question could 
hypothetically be blocked. The assessment is counterfactual because, in many cases, the flows 
cannot actually be blocked or only partially so. The assessment is therefore subject to the 
analytical perspective of the observer, but we believe that this needs to be done in an explicit 
way to facilitate public debate. Our definition allows us to make sense of the perception that not 
all illegal flows are necessarily illicit, while some legal flows may be illicit. The task of policy is 
to identify both the particular capital flows that can be classified as illicit, but also the subset of 
illicit flows that can be feasibly targeted. 
 
What constitutes damage in the sense of a negative developmental impact depends on how we 
define development. When illicit capital flows are equated with illegal outflows (as in Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith 2008; Baker and Nordin 2007), the implicit suggestion is that adherence to 
prevailing legal rules is sufficient for promoting the social good.1
 
 Yet, the use of the notion of 
illicitness also suggests that damaging developmental outcomes may not always correspond to 
violations of the law and that, therefore, social, economic, and political damage needs to be more 
precisely defined. Moreover, if we are not to suffer the criticism of paternalism, our criteria have 
to be widely accepted as legitimate in that society. In practice, it is difficult to establish the 
criteria that measure development and therefore can be used to identify damage in any society, 
but particularly in developing ones. A social consensus may not exist if there are deep divisions 
about social goals. However, as a first step, we can insist that analysts and observers making 
judgments about illicit flows at least make their own criteria explicit. This will allow us to see if 
these criteria are so far away from what are likely to be the minimal shared assumptions in a 
society as to make the analysis problematic. In addition, because the effect of capital flows (and 
economic policies in general) is often heavily disputed, we also require an explicit reference to 
analytical models that identify how particular capital flows affect particular developmental goals. 
Making all this explicit is important because observers may disagree in their choices on these 
issues. 
Our definition suggests that capital flows that are strictly within the law may be illicit if they 
damage society and that, conversely, flows that evade or avoid the law may sometimes be 
benign, and blocking some of these flows may have adverse consequences. However, all illegal 
capital flows may be judged illicit from a broader perspective if the violation of laws is judged to 
be damaging for development regardless of the specific outcomes associated with law-breaking. 
We argue that this position is easier to sustain in advanced countries where the formal structure 
of rules is more or less effectively enforced by rule-based states and where political processes 
ensure that legal frameworks are relatively closely integrated with the evolution of socially 
acceptable compromises to sustain political stability and economic growth. The ongoing global 
financial and economic crisis has demonstrated that this picture does not always hold true even 
in advanced countries. Meanwhile, developing countries are typically characterized by 
significant informality in social organization; laws, if they exist, are, in general, weakly enforced 
and do not typically reflect worked out social compromises and economic programs, and 
                                                 
1  “The term, illicit financial flows, pertains to the crossborder movement of money that is illegally earned, 
transferred, or utilized” (Global Financial Integrity summary fact sheet on illicit financial flows [IFFs], 
http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/illicit%20flows%20from%20developing%20countries%20overview%2
0w%20table.pdf [emphasis in the original]). 
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significant aspects of the economy and polity therefore operate through informal arrangements 
and informality in the enforcement of formal rules (Khan 2005, 2010). Violations of formal rules 
are widespread in these contexts and do not necessarily provide even a first approximation of 
social damage. 
 
To keep the analysis broad enough to include different types of societies, what then should we be 
looking for to judge damage to society? Is damage to be judged by the effects of particular flows 
on economic growth, or income distribution, or different measures of poverty, or some 
combination of the above? We suggest that we should use the least demanding way of judging 
damage because the more minimal our requirement, the more likely we are to find broad support 
across observers who may disagree at the level of more detailed specifications. 
 
An illicit financial flow (IFF), according to our minimal definition, is one that has an overall 
negative effect on economic growth, taking into account both direct and indirect effects in the 
context of the specific political settlement of a country. A flow that has not directly affected 
economic growth, but has undermined the viability of a given political settlement without 
preparing the ground for an alternative sustainable political settlement may be seen to have, 
indirectly, a negative effect after we account for adjustments that are likely as a result of a 
decline in political stability. It is now increasingly recognized that the different ways in which 
the political and social order is constructed in developing countries have important implications 
for how institutions and the economy function (North et al. 2007). Because the construction of 
political settlements (and, in North’s terminology, of social orders) differs significantly across 
societies, the economic and political effects of particular financial flows are also likely to be 
different. 
 
Our definition has some overlaps with, but also important points of departure from the way in 
which damaging capital flight has been analyzed in the economics literature. The loss of 
developmental resources through capital flows from poor to rich economies has been an 
important topic of development economics since its inception. In particular, the literature on 
capital flight had made the problem of abnormal capital outflows from developing countries its 
main interest long before the policy focus on illicit capital outflows from such economies 
emerged. A brief review of this literature allows us to identify systematically different core 
drivers of capital flight highlighted by different strands of the literature. Our review also 
establishes the problems associated with ignoring the structural differences in the types of 
political settlements across countries, problems that our definition of illicit capital flight 
specifically addresses. 
 
 
From capital flight as abnormal capital outflows to single-driver models of capital flight 
In 1937, Charles Kindleberger famously defined capital flight as “abnormal” capital outflows 
“propelled from a country . . . by . . . any one or more of a complex list of fears and suspicions” 
(Kindleberger 1937, 158). A specialist of European financial history, Kindleberger had in mind 
well-known episodes of European capital flight going back to the 16th century, as well as the 
troubles of crisis-ridden Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. In most of these historical cases, this 
“complex list of fears and suspicions” can be attributed to specific events or to exceptionally 
disruptive periods of political, social, and economic change or confrontation. To differentiate ex 
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post between abnormal capital outflows driven by profound uncertainty (fear and suspicion) 
about the future on the one hand and, on the other hand, normal capital outflows driven by usual 
business considerations was a rather straightforward exercise in those contexts. 
 
For policy purposes, however, such ex post analyses are of limited relevance. What matters is 
sufficient ex ante knowledge of the factors that differentiate an abnormal from normal situations. 
Such ex ante knowledge—to facilitate effective preventive policy options—will have to include 
consideration of the determinants of precisely those economic, political, and social factors that 
may trigger the disruption that we regard as obvious from an ex post perspective. There may not 
be any general or abstract solution in the sense that what qualifies as capital flight requiring a 
policy response may differ across countries. A half-century on from his original contribution, 
Kindleberger himself struck a considerably more cautious note in this respect, as follows: 
 
It is difficult—perhaps impossible—to make a rigorous definition of capital flight for the 
purpose of devising policies to cope with it. Do we restrict cases to domestic capital sent 
abroad, or should foreign capital precipitously pulled out of a country be included? What 
about the capital that emigrants take with them, especially when the people involved are 
being persecuted . . . ? Does it make a difference whether the emigration is likely to be 
permanent or temporary, to the extent that anyone can tell ex ante? And what about the cases 
where there is no net export of capital, but capital is being returned to the country as foreign 
investment . . . ? Is there a valid distinction to be made between capital that is expatriated on 
a long-term basis for fear of confiscatory taxation, and domestic speculation against the 
national currency through buying foreign exchange that is ostensibly interested in short-term 
profits? (Kindleberger 1990, 326–27) 
 
As attention shifted to capital flight from contemporary developing economies, in particular in 
the wake of the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, a growing consensus emerged 
about the difficulty of isolating specific determinants of abnormal capital outflows ex ante 
(Dooley 1986; Khan and Ul Haque 1985; Vos 1992). While there was some agreement on basic 
characteristics of abnormal outflows (that they tend to be permanent, not primarily aimed at asset 
diversification, and not generating recorded foreign exchange income), the original effort to 
identify the characteristics of abnormal capital outflows was replaced by definitions of capital 
flight in terms of a single-core driver, perceived differently by different approaches (Dooley 
1986, 1988; Cuddington 1987). 
 
Capital flight as portfolio choice 
First, the portfolio approach adopts standard models of expected utility maximization by rational 
economic agents to explain capital flight as a portfolio diversification response to higher foreign 
returns relative to domestic returns on assets (Khan and Ul Haque 1985; Lessard and Williamson 
1987; Dooley 1988; Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001). More specifically, this involves a 
counterfactual comparison of after-tax domestic and foreign returns, adjusted for a range of 
variables, such as expected depreciation, volatility of returns, liquidity premiums, and various 
indicators of investment risk, including indexes of corruption. In this view, capital flight is 
caused by the existence of market distortions and asymmetric risks in developing countries 
(relative to advanced economies). The underlying market-theoretical model of economic 
development builds on four core premises: (1) economic behavior relevant to capital flight is 
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correctly described by expected utility maximization, (2) markets exist universally (and thus can 
be distorted), (3) individual agents possess the ability to compute the probabilities of investment 
risk globally and on the basis of counterfactual investment models, and (4) computable 
probabilities can be attached to all events. 
 
These are obviously fairly restrictive assumptions in any case. In the present context, however, 
the most important conceptual drawback is illustrated by the following remark of a Brazilian 
economist: 
 
Why is it that when an American puts money abroad it is called “foreign investment” and 
when an Argentinean does the same, it is called “capital flight”? Why is it that when an 
American company puts 30 percent of its equity abroad, it is called “strategic diversification” 
and when a Bolivian businessman puts only 4 percent abroad, it is called “lack of 
confidence”? (Cumby and Levich 1987, quoted in Franko 2003, 89) 
 
The obvious answer is that, relative to overall domestic resources, more domestic capital tends to 
flee for longer from Argentina and Bolivia than from the United States and that this is so because 
structural uncertainty about future investment opportunities is higher in the former economies. 
To prevent relatively scarce capital from voting with its feet in situations of great structural 
uncertainty, developing countries are more likely to impose regulatory barriers on free capital 
movement, thus turning what might simply appear to be good business sense into illegal capital 
flight. 
 
By focusing on a single broad motive for capital flight, namely, utility maximization in the 
presence of differential policy regimes and investment risks, the portfolio approach conflates 
short-term utility (and profit) maximization with structural political and economic uncertainties. 
No systematic distinction is made between the drivers of asymmetric investment risks in 
developing economies, which may range from inflation and exchange rate depreciation to 
expectations of confiscatory taxation and outright politically motivated expropriation. Similarly, 
policy-induced market distortions can range from short-term fiscal and monetary policies, 
common to all economies, to policies promoting long-term structural and institutional changes 
with much more wide-ranging (and often more uncertain) implications for future investment 
opportunities. This failure to distinguish between different drivers of capital flight considerably 
weakens the effectiveness of the policy implications arising from this approach. This consists 
essentially in the recommendation of market-friendly reforms to eliminate such market 
distortions on the assumption that these will also minimize asymmetric investment risks. If, 
however, markets do not as yet exist or suffer from fundamental structural weaknesses, market-
friendly reforms may be insufficient to minimize differential investment risk relative to, for 
example, advanced economies. 
 
This problem is, in fact, at least partially recognized by advocates of this approach. Some authors 
use a narrow statistical measure of capital flight, the hot money measure, which limits capital 
flight to short-term speculative capital outflows of the private nonbank sector (taken to be the 
primary source of net errors and omissions in a country’s balance of payments) (for example, see 
Cuddington 1986, 1987). In contrast, the most widely used statistical definition of capital flight, 
often referred to as the residual measure, includes recorded and nonrecorded acquisitions of 
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medium- and short-term assets and uses broader estimates of capital inflows (World Bank 1985; 
Erbe 1985; Myrvin and Hughes Hallett 1992). 2
 
 Cuddington thus reemphasizes the idea that 
abnormal capital outflows of money running away are a reaction to exceptional circumstances 
and events rather than ordinary business, although, in times of extensive deregulation of 
international financial markets, this conjecture may be less convincing. Other authors have taken 
a different route to distinguish portfolio capital flight from other forms of capital flight, in 
particular that induced by extreme political instability, such as civil war (Tornell and Velasco 
1992; Collier 1999). In the latter case, capital flight can occur despite lower actual foreign 
returns relative to potential domestic returns (if peace could be achieved) and is part of a wider 
outflow of productive resources, including labor. 
The social controls approach to capital flight 
A second strand of the capital flight literature defines capital flight as “the movement of private 
capital from one jurisdiction to another in order to reduce the actual or potential level of social 
control over capital” (Boyce and Zarsky 1988, 192). To the extent that such capital flight is 
motivated primarily by the pursuit of private economic gain, this social control definition is not 
radically different from the portfolio approach. In both cases, capital flight occurs in response to 
policy intervention. However, the “social controls” approach rests 
 
upon an explicit premise absent in much conventional economic theory, namely that 
individual control over capital is rarely absolute or uncontested, but rather subject to social 
constraints, the character and extent of which vary through time. Unlike many authors, 
Boyce and Zarsky, therefore do not consider capital flight to be necessarily “abnormal.” 
(Rishi and Boyce 1990, 1645) 
 
As with the portfolio approach, there is no systematic distinction between fundamentally 
different drivers of capital flight. All capital flight occurs in response to government controls, 
whether these concern short-term macroeconomic stabilization through fiscal and monetary 
policy measures or more long-term structural interventions. However, in this case, the underlying 
model of the economy is not that of universal and competitive markets inhabited by maximizers 
of expected utility and profits, but rather that of a mixed economy in which markets are one set 
of several institutions ultimately governed by a (welfare or developmental) state or, more 
broadly, by social interventions from outside the market sphere. Different from the portfolio 
approach, the main policy implication is therefore not simply a focus to promote markets, but to 
minimize capital flight through the strengthening of existing social controls or the introduction of 
alternative, more effective administrative measures to control private capital movements. 
 
The social controls approach remains ambiguous, however, about the origin and legitimacy of 
social (capital) controls. A weak version of the approach identifies governments as the core 
players in social control, and no explicit judgment is made about the legitimacy or effectiveness 
                                                 
2 The most commonly applied variant of this residual measure subtracts capital outflows or uses of foreign exchange 
(the current account deficit and increases in central bank reserves) from capital inflows (net external borrowing, plus 
net foreign direct investment). An excess of inflows over outflows is interpreted as indicative of capital flight. 
Nonbank variants of this measure include net acquisitions of foreign assets by the private banking system in capital 
outflows. 
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of specific government controls. This position comes closest to the portfolio approach. In this 
vein, Walter, for example, argues that capital flight 
 
appears to consist of a subset of international asset redeployments or portfolio adjustments—
undertaken in response to significant perceived deterioration in risk/return profiles associated 
with assets located in a particular country—that occur in the presence of conflict between 
objectives of asset holders and the government. It may or may not violate the law. It is 
always considered by authorities to violate an implied social contract. (Walter 1987, 105) 
 
By contrast, the strong version adopts the more heroic assumption that social (capital) controls 
reflect some kind of a social consensus about the ways in which economic development is best 
achieved. The implied social contract here is not one merely perceived by government authorities 
to exist, but one based on genuine social approval. A recent example is the observation of 
Epstein, as follows: 
 
When people hear the term “capital flight” they think of money running away from one 
country to a money “haven” abroad, in the process doing harm to the home economy and 
society. People probably have the idea that money runs away for any of a number of reasons: 
to avoid taxation; to avoid confiscation; in search of better treatment, or of higher returns 
somewhere else. In any event, people have a sense that capital flight is in some way illicit, in 
some way bad for the home country, unless, of course, capital is fleeing unfair 
discrimination, as in the case of Nazi persecution. (Epstein 2006, 3; italics added) 
 
For Epstein (2006, 3–4), capital flight is therefore an “inherently political phenomenon” and also 
mainly “the prerogative of those—usually the wealthy—with access to foreign exchange.” This 
view entails a more explicitly normative position than either the portfolio approach or the weak 
version of the social controls approach in that capital flight is characterized not only as 
economically damaging for development, but also as illegitimate from the perspective of an 
existing consensus about the social (developmental) good. 
 
Capital flight as dirty money 
Both the portfolio approach and the social controls approach broadly interpret capital flight as a 
response by private capital to expectations of lower domestic returns relative to foreign returns 
on assets. Both are outcome oriented in that their primary concern is with the macroeconomic 
analysis of the perceived damage inflicted by capital flight on developing economies rather than 
with the origins of flight capital or the methods by which it is being transferred abroad. They 
differ with regard to their analytical benchmark models of a normal or ideal economy. Whereas 
the portfolio approach subscribes to variants of the standard model of a competitive free-market 
economy, the social controls approach adopts a mixed economy model in which the social 
control of private capital, for example by a welfare state, is normal. This translates into different 
single-driver models of capital flight. In the first case, the driver is simply profit (or utility) 
maximization (or the minimization of investment risk) at a global level, and the damage done 
arises not from capital flight per se, but from market distortions that lower relative returns on 
domestic private assets. In the second case, the driver is the avoidance of policy controls, and the 
damage arises from private capital breaking implicit or explicit social contracts. These models 
overlap only in so far as (1) market distortions arise from domestic policy interventions rather 
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than other exogenous shocks and (2) social controls are judged, in any particular context, to be 
poorly designed so as to undermine rather than promote economic development and thus violate 
the implicit or explicit social contract. 
 
The more recent literature on illicit capital flows adopts an explicitly normative perspective on 
capital flight that focuses primarily on adherence to the law or perceived good practice. Illicit 
capital flows are flows that break the implicit rules asserted as desirable by the observer. A 
crossborder movement of capital that, at any stage from its generation to its use, involves the 
deployment of illegal or abusive activities or practices is illicit. Probably the most well known 
example of this procedural or rule-based perspective on capital flight is Baker’s notion of dirty 
money that distinguishes criminal, corrupt, and commercial forms of illicit capital flows (a term 
used interchangeably with dirty money) (Baker 2005; Baker and Nordin 2007). Criminal flows 
encompass “a boundless range of villainous activities including racketeering, trafficking in 
counterfeit and contraband goods, alien smuggling, slave trading, embezzlement, forgery, 
securities fraud, credit fraud, burglary, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and more” (Baker 2005, 
23). Corrupt flows stem “from bribery and theft by (foreign) government officials” trying to hide 
the proceeds from such activities abroad, and the commercial component of dirty money stems 
from tax evasion and mispriced or falsified asset swaps, including trade misinvoicing and 
abusive transfer pricing (Baker 2005, 23). Of these components of dirty money, illicit 
commercial flows have been estimated to account for around two-thirds of all illicit outflows, 
and proceeds from corruption for the smallest part, around 5 percent of the total (Eurodad 
2008b). 
 
This rule-based dirty money approach leads to a conceptual definition of capital flight that is 
narrower than the definitions adopted by more conventional approaches. First, definitions of 
capital flight here are mostly limited to unrecorded capital flows. Thus, Kapoor (2007, 6–7), for 
example, defines capital flight as the “unrecorded and (mostly) untaxed illicit leakage of capital 
and resources out of a country,” a definition taken up by Heggstad and Fjeldstad (2010, 7), who 
argue that its characteristics include 
 
that the resources are domestic wealth that is permanently put out of reach for domestic 
authorities. Much of the value is unrecorded, and attempts to hide the origin, destination and 
true ownership of the capital are parts of the concept. 
 
This does not necessarily translate into the adoption of narrow statistical measures of capital 
flight, such as hot money estimates that take account only of unrecorded capital flows in the 
balance of payments. Rather, measures of illicit capital flows attempt to capture as many likely 
conduits for such flows as possible, in practice integrating different conventional measures of 
capital flight with estimates of trade misinvoicing (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008). 
 
Second, consistent with the conceptual focus on dirty money, the core driver of capital flight is 
also more narrowly defined, as follows: 
 
The term flight capital is most commonly applied in reference to money that shifts out of 
developing countries, usually into western economies. Motivations for such shifts are usually 
regarded as portfolio diversification or fears of political or economic instability or fears of 
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taxation or inflation or confiscation. All of these are valid explanations for the phenomenon, 
yet the most common motivation appears to be, instead, a desire for the hidden accumulation 
of wealth. (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008, 2; emphasis added) 
 
However, capital flight in response to return differentials, asymmetric investment risks, or 
perceived macroeconomic mismanagement through social controls can also occur in the open, in 
particular in a highly deregulated financial environment. Thus, the main concern of conventional 
approaches to capital flight is with wealth accumulation abroad in general, rather than 
exclusively or even primarily with hidden wealth accumulation. 
 
Finally, illicit capital flows are also often equated with illegal outflows, on the grounds that 
funds originating in (or intended for) illicit activities have to be hidden and will eventually 
disappear from any records in the transferring country (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008; Baker 
and Nordin 2007). This narrows conventional definitions of capital flight because the latter’s 
focus on capital outflows that are, in some sense, damaging to the economy is not limited to 
illegal outflows. How extensive the overlap between illegal and damaging capital outflows is 
will depend on how closely and effectively legal frameworks encapsulate the social or economic 
good, defined in terms of the respective underlying benchmark models of an ideal or licit state of 
affairs. 
 
In fact, the equation of illegal and illicit capital outflows is not systematically sustained, even in 
the dirty money approach. At least some of the activities included in the analysis of dirty money 
are not illegal, but refer to practices characterized as abusive, such as aspects of transfer pricing, 
specific uses made of tax havens, and corrupt activities that have not necessarily been outlawed. 
Rather, the procedural or rule-based focus on adherence to the law in this approach to capital 
flight is based on an implicit claim that adherence to the law will promote economic 
development or, more generally, the social good. If the principal motivation for capital flight is, 
in fact, “the external, often hidden, accumulation of wealth, and this far outweighs concerns 
about taxes” (Baker and Nordin 2007, 2), the policy response has to be directed primarily at 
eliminating the dirty money structure through the enforcement of national and global standards 
of financial transparency and democratic accountability. The core obstacle to economic 
development then becomes the lack of good governance, corruption, and the absence of or 
weaknesses in the rule of law (rather than specific legislation). 
 
Thus, the dirty money approach to illicit capital flows from developing countries differs from 
more conventional definitions of capital flight mainly in that it appears to be rooted less in 
outcome-oriented models of economic growth and development, but in a specific rule-based 
liberal model of good governance and a good polity, perceived to be a necessary condition for 
achieving any more substantially defined social good. 
 
From the above, we see that the literature identifies three core drivers of capital flight from 
developing economies, each implying a different underlying view of what constitutes damage to 
these economies and each adopting a monocausal perspective. Figure 2.1 summarizes features of 
these approaches, as follows: 
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1. In the portfolio approach, social damage is a result of interference with competitive markets 
that are presumed to otherwise exist. Capital flight is driven by economic incentives to 
escape such interference given profit-maximizing investment strategies. The best way to 
eliminate capital flight in this perspective is to remove the damaging government 
interventions in competitive markets. This largely ignores the fact that competitive markets 
require government regulation even in advanced economies and that extensive market 
failures imply that significant government intervention may be required to achieve 
developmental outcomes in developing economies. 
2. The social controls approach is almost the mirror image of the portfolio approach. All social 
controls over private capital movements are presumed to reflect a legitimate social contract 
that is welfare enhancing. As a result, capital outflows that violate social controls imposed by 
a welfare-developmental state are damaging and illicit, presumably because the indirect 
effects of violating the social contract will be socially damaging. The best way to eliminate 
capital flight is to reinforce social controls. This largely ignores the fact that not all formal 
social controls and regulations in developing countries are legitimate, growth enhancing, or 
politically viable. 
3. In the dirty money approach, social damage is the result of violating the rule of law. Capital 
flight is driven by the desire to accumulate wealth by hiding from the rule of law. No 
substantial view on what constitutes social, economic, or political damage is typically 
offered. This largely ignores the fact that, in developing countries in particular, existing legal 
frameworks may not adequately encapsulate the economic and political conditions necessary 
to achieve whichever substantial idea of the social good is adopted (economic development, 
social justice, the preservation of specific human rights, and so on). 
 
Figure 2.1. Definitions of Capital Flight 
 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
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3. Illicit Capital Outflows: An Alternative Policy Framework 
 
The discussion above suggests that the search for a conceptual definition of capital flight in 
general and of illicit capital outflows from developing countries in particular has been motivated 
by differing perceptions of what constitutes the social or developmental good. Implicit 
differences in the values and theoretical models of observers explain the significant differences 
in how illicit capital flows have been defined. These hidden differences are not conducive for 
developing effective policy responses on the basis of which some minimum agreement can be 
reached. We believe we can go to the core of the problem by defining illicit capital flows as 
outflows that cause damage to the economic development of the country, taking into account all 
direct and indirect effects that are likely, given the specific political settlement. 
 
An implicit assumption in many conventional approaches is that all flight capital, however 
defined, will yield a higher rate of social return in developing economies if it can be retained 
domestically (Schneider 2003a; Cumby and Levich 1987; Walter 1987). From a policy 
perspective, locking in potential flight capital is supposed to reduce the loss of developmental 
resources directly and indirectly stabilize domestic financial markets and improve the domestic 
tax base (Cuddington 1986). In contrast, we argue that the problems faced by countries with 
capital flight can be different in nature. The widely shared premise of a general negative 
relationship between capital outflows and domestic capital accumulation simply is not valid 
(Gordon and Levine 1989). Dynamic links among capital flows, economic growth, technological 
change, and political constraints mean that, even in advanced economies, the regulation of 
capital outflows is an uphill and evolving task. In developing countries, too, some capital 
outflows may be desirable to sustain development. Moreover, the idea underlying some of the 
illicit capital flow literature that adherence to the law is sufficient for identifying the social or 
economic good clearly does not always apply. 
 
On the basis of our minimalist definition of illicit capital flows, we proceed to develop a simple 
three-tier typology of economic and political constellations and governance structures and the 
ways in which these pose policy challenges in controlling illicit capital outflows. Specifically, 
we distinguish between advanced economies (in opposition to developing countries in general), 
and, within the latter group, we distinguish between normal or intermediate developing countries 
and fragile developing countries. 
 
Advanced economies: the differences with respect to developing economies 
Advanced economies are likely to be supported by rule-based states and political institutions 
such that the social compromises for political stability and the economic policies required for 
sustaining growth—the political settlement—are reflected and codified in an evolving set of 
laws. In these contexts, it is not unreasonable to expect that as a first approximation, damaging 
capital flows are likely to be capital flows that violate existing laws. Illegal capital flows are 
likely to be damaging and can justifiably be described as illicit in this context. However, some 
damaging flows may not be illegal if laws do not fully reflect these conditions or have not caught 
up with the changing economic and political conditions involved in sustaining growth. For 
instance, the proliferation of inadequately regulated financial instruments that resulted in the 
financial crisis of 2008 was driven by financial flows that were, in many cases, not illegal, but 
turned out, ex post, to be seriously damaging. A focus on identifying damaging financial flows 
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independently of the existing legal framework may therefore be helpful even in advanced 
countries, though, most of the time, a focus on illegal financial flows may be adequate. 
 
Advanced economies, by definition, have extensive productive sectors, which is why they have 
high levels of average income. As a result, formal taxation can play an important role not only in 
providing public goods, but also in sustaining significant levels of formal, tax-financed 
redistribution. Both help to achieve political stability and sustain existing political settlements. 
Taxation may be strongly contested by the rich, but an implicit social contract is likely to exist 
whereby social interdependence is recognized and feasible levels of redistributive taxation are 
negotiated. Significant fiscal resources also provide the resources to protect property rights and 
enforce a rule of law effectively. 
 
Tax evasion and capital flight in this context are likely to represent individual greed and free-
riding behavior rather than escape routes from unsustainable levels of taxation. Moreover, if 
economic policies and redistributive taxation represent the outcome of political negotiations 
between different groups, illegal capital flows would also be illicit in the sense of damaging the 
sustainability of the political settlement and thereby, possibly, having damaging indirect effects 
on economic growth. Transparency, accountability, and the enforcement of the rule of law can 
therefore be regarded as mechanisms for limiting tax-avoiding capital flight and other forms of 
illicit capital flows in advanced countries. 
 
Nonetheless, even within advanced countries, if legal arrangements cease to reflect economic 
and redistributive arrangements acceptable to major social constituencies, the correspondence 
between illegal and illicit can break down. The more recent discussion of illicit capital flows in 
advanced countries has to be considered in a context in which the increase in the bargaining 
power of the rich to define economic laws in their own interest has exceeded the pace at which 
other social groups have accepted these changes. This allows us to make sense of the more recent 
preoccupation with IFFs in many countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) where the concern with dirty money has been closely associated with 
changes in the structure of many of these economies as a result of the decline in manufacturing 
and a growth in the service sectors, in particular finance. The result has been not only a gradual 
change in the formal structure of taxation and redistribution in ways that reflect the regressive 
changes in power, but also a growing tendency of the super-rich to evade even existing legal 
redistributive arrangements through financial innovations or outright illegal capital flows. The 
avoidance and evasion of taxation have not been uncontested in advanced countries. Many social 
groups have criticized these developments and questioned the legitimacy of capital flows that 
seek to avoid and evade taxes. This constitutes an important part of the concern with illicit 
capital flows in advanced countries. 
 
Palma (2005) points to the significant decline in manufacturing profits as a share of total profits 
in advanced countries over the last three decades and the concomitant search for global financial, 
technological, and resource rents (see also Smithin 1996). The decline in manufacturing can at 
least partly explain the significant change in income distribution in OECD countries, generally in 
favor of the highest income groups. For example, in the United States, the average real income of 
the bottom 120 million families remained roughly stagnant between 1973 and 2006, while that of 
the top 0.01 percent of income earners increased 8.5 times, meaning that the multiple between 
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the two income groups rose from 115 to 970. During the four years of economic expansion under 
the Bush Administration, 73 percent of total (pretax) income growth accrued to the top 1 percent 
of income earners compared with 45 percent during the seven years of economic expansion 
under the Clinton Administration (Palma 2009). The structural change in advanced countries is 
obviously complex and differs across countries, but there has been a significant structural change 
over the last few decades, and the redistributive arrangements that emerged out of the postwar 
political consensus have faced renegotiation as a result. 
 
The contemporary concern with illicit capital flows in advanced countries is motivated by a 
growing dissatisfaction both with the enforcement of law and with the extent to which the law in 
critical areas still effectively supports the social good. Narrower debates about illegal capital 
flows have focused on capital movements that have flouted existing legal redistributive 
arrangements because of the growing power of the rich to evade taxes through complex financial 
instruments and the threat of relocation to other jurisdictions. But a more profound concern with 
illicit capital flows is based on a feeling of unease that the increase in the political power of these 
new sectors has enabled them to change laws without the acquiescence of groups in society that 
would once have had a say. This includes changes in laws that have weakened regulatory control 
over capital seeking to move much more freely in search of risky profits or tax havens. Even 
legal capital flows could be deemed to be illicit from this perspective if economic welfare or 
political stability were threatened by a unilateral redefinition of the implicit social contract. 
 
The steady deregulation of financial flows in advanced countries in the 1980s and 1990s is a case 
in point. Changes in regulatory structures increased returns to the financial sector, arguably at the 
expense of greater systemic risk for the rest of society, and diminished the ability of states to tax 
these sectors (Eatwell and Taylor 2000). Some of the associated financial flows could therefore 
easily be judged to have been illicit according to our definition. Underlying this judgment is the 
implicit claim that the restructuring of law is based on an emergent distribution of power that is 
not legitimate because it eventually produces economic and political costs in which many social 
constituencies no longer acquiesce and that thereby threatens to become unsustainable (Crotty 
2009; Wray 2009; Pollin 2003). The concern here is that some of these financial flows were 
illicit either because they were directly damaging to the economy or because they damaged the 
political settlement in unsustainable ways and may eventually bring about economic costs in the 
form of social protests and declining political stability. These are obviously matters of judgment, 
but our definition provides a consistent way of structuring the policy debate without getting 
locked into a monocausal definition. 
 
As long as the new sectors grew rapidly, the critique that some capital flows were illicit (even if 
legal) remained a fringe argument. However, the financial crisis of 2008, largely the result of 
excessive risk taking by an insufficiently regulated financial sector, showed, ex post, that some 
of these financial flows were not only questionable in terms of their legitimacy and their impact 
on social agreements, they were damaging in a straightforward sense of economic viability. If the 
political process in advanced countries responds to these pressures by enacting laws that 
combine socially acceptable redistributive arrangements with regulatory structures that make 
sense for sustained economic growth, the law could once again reflect a broadbased social 
compromise grounded on maintaining politically sustainable economic growth. Under these 
circumstances, illicit capital flows will once again become coterminous with illegal capital flows. 
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Even so, the basic features of advanced countries that we discuss above have often created an 
expectation that a rule of law can and should be enforced at a global level, making illicit capital 
flows relatively easy to identify and target. Unfortunately, while this analysis makes sense at the 
level of individual advanced countries, it falls apart as an analytical framework at a global level. 
It ignores the obvious fact that global laws guiding economic policy or capital flows would only 
be legitimate if there were a global social consensus based on the same principles of 
redistributive taxation and social provision on which cohesive societies are constructed at the 
level of individual countries. It also presumes that a global agency would have the fiscal 
resources to enforce laws at the global level in the same way that individual advanced countries 
can enforce national laws. None of these presumptions are reasonable given the current global 
gaps among countries in terms of economics and politics. By our definition, the absence of a 
sustainable global political settlement based on global redistributive and enforcement capabilities 
makes problematic any attempt to define IFFs at the global level. 
 
To understand this more clearly, the differences between the political settlements in advanced 
and developing countries need to be spelled out. First, developing countries are structurally 
different because their internal political stability and economic development are not (and cannot 
normally be) organized through formal rules and laws to the extent observed in advanced 
countries. In developing countries, the legal framework is not an adequate guide for identifying 
illicit capital flows even as a first approximation. There are two essential limitations on a purely 
legal analysis of what is illicit in the typical developing country. First, in the realm of politics, 
the internal political stability of developing countries is not solely or even primarily based on 
social agreements consolidated through legal fiscal redistributions. For a variety of reasons, 
including limited fiscal space and more intense conflicts given the context of social 
transformations, redistributive fiscal arrangements are typically less transparent and less formal 
compared with those in advanced countries. The political problem involves delivering resources 
to powerful constituencies that would otherwise be the source of political instability in a context 
of fiscal scarcity. 
 
If politically powerful constituencies have to be accommodated legitimately and transparently, 
acceptable redistributions to more deserving groups such as the severely poor have to be agreed 
upon simultaneously to achieve political legitimacy. The fiscal sums typically do not add up in 
developing countries for a redistributive package that would pass the test of public legitimacy, as 
well as provide the redistribution required by powerful groups. As a result, it is not surprising 
that the critical redistributions to powerful constituencies typically occur through patron-client 
politics and other mechanisms characterized by limited transparency. If successful, these 
arrangements achieve political stabilization by incorporating sufficient numbers of politically 
powerful factions within the ruling coalition. Even in developing countries where significant 
fiscal redistribution takes place, critical parts of the overall system of political redistribution are 
not based on transparently negotiated arrangements codified in fiscal laws and economic policies 
(Khan 2005). 
 
Second, the economies of developing countries are also significantly different from the 
economies of advanced countries. Their formal or regulated modern sectors are normally a small 
part of the economy, and a much larger informal sector is unregulated or only partially regulated. 
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Much of the economy, including the formal sector, suffers from low productivity and does not 
generate a big enough taxable surplus to pay for across-the-board protection of property rights 
and adequate economic regulation. The achievement of competitiveness also often requires 
periods of government assistance and strong links between business and politics. This is because, 
even though wages may be low, the productivity of the modern sector is often even lower. 
Developing countries have poor infrastructure and poor skills in labor and management, and, in 
particular, they lack much of the tacit knowledge required to use modern technologies 
efficiently, even the most labor-intensive ones. 
 
The strategies through which developing countries progress up the technology ladder while 
maintaining their internal political arrangements can differ substantially across countries (Khan 
and Blankenburg 2009). These strategies usually involve creating opportunities and conditions 
for profitable investment in at least a few sectors at a time. Because the creation of profitable 
conditions across the board is beyond the fiscal capacities of developing countries, these 
strategies inevitably create privileges for the modern sector and, often, for particular subsectors 
through government interventions in prices, exchange rates, interest rates, regulations, taxes, 
subsidies, and other policy instruments. The strategies for assisting learning in industrial policy 
countries such as the East Asian tigers are well known. But the growth of modern sectors in all 
developing countries has required accidents or smaller-scale policy interventions that overcame 
the built-in disadvantages of operating profitably given the adverse initial conditions (Khan 
2009). Some of this assistance may be formal and legal, but other aspects of assistance may be 
informal and even illegal. For instance, some firms may informally have privileged access to 
land, licenses, and other public resources. Some of these privileges may be important in 
offsetting initial low productivity or the higher costs created by poor infrastructure and the poor 
enforcement of property rights and the rule of law. Deliberately or otherwise, these arrangements 
can assist some firms in starting production in adverse conditions and engage in learning by 
doing, but they can also simply provide privileges to unproductive groups (Khan and Jomo 2000; 
Khan 2006). 
 
Thus, in many cases, business-government links in developing countries are predatory from the 
perspective of the broader society. Resources captured by privileged firms in the modern sector 
are wasted, and, in these cases, the modern sector remains inefficient at significant social cost. 
However, in other cases, periods of hand-holding and bailouts do lead to the emergence of global 
competitiveness through formal and informal links between emerging enterprises and the state. 
The efficacy of developmental strategies depends on the nature of the relationships between 
business and politics, the compulsions on both sides to generate productivity growth over time, 
the time horizons, and so on, but not in any simple way on the degree to which formal laws are 
upheld (Khan and Blankenburg 2009; Khan 2009). 
 
It is not surprising that all developing countries fail the test of adherence to a rule of law and 
political accountability. Yet, some developing countries perform much better than others in terms 
of politically sustainable growth that eventually results in poverty reduction, economic 
development, and movement toward the economic and political conditions of advanced 
countries. These observations suggest that what constitutes a damaging financial flow may be 
more difficult to identify in developing countries. Because of the significant differences in the 
economic and political conditions across developing countries, we find it useful to distinguish 
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between normal developing countries, which we call intermediate developers, and fragile 
developers that suffer from more serious crises in their political settlements. 
 
Normal developing countries: the intermediate developers 
Our term intermediate developers refers to the typical or normal developing country in which 
internal political and economic arrangements sustain political stability. Their internal political 
settlements can be quite varied, but also differ from those in advanced countries in that their 
reproduction typically requires significant informal arrangements in both redistributive 
arrangements and the organization of production. Nonetheless, in most developing countries, 
there is a political settlement that has characteristics of reproducibility, and these societies can 
sustain economic and political viability. This does not mean that the governments are universally 
recognized as legitimate, nor are violence and conflict entirely absent, but the political 
arrangements are able to achieve development (at different rates) without descending into 
unsustainable levels of violence.3
 
 Countries in this category include, for example, China and 
most countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In contrast, fragile developers 
are countries such as Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo in which a minimally 
sustainable political settlement among the contending forces in society does not exist and in 
which the fundamental problem is to construct this in the first place. 
Our analysis of illicit capital flows from intermediate developers can be simplified by 
distinguishing between political and economic actors according to their motivations for making 
decisions about financial flows. The former are likely to be concerned about threats to the 
processes through which they accumulate resources and about the political threats to these 
resources; the latter are likely to be primarily concerned with profit opportunities and 
expropriation risk. In reality, political and economic actors may sometimes be the same persons; 
in this case, we have to look at the motivations jointly. The simplification may nonetheless help 
one to think through the different analytical issues involved so that appropriate policies can be 
identified in particular cases. 
 
–Financial outflows driven by political actors 
An obvious reason why political actors in developing countries may engage in capital flight is 
that their opponents may expropriate their assets if the opponents come to power. A significant 
amount of the resource accumulation is likely to have violated some aspect of the structure of 
formal laws. The legality can be questioned by the next ruling coalition for a number of reasons, 
including expeditious political reasons, for instance, to undermine the ability of previous ruling 
factions to return to power. Let us assume that this capital flight is immediately damaging 
because it represents a loss of resources. The issue from the perspective of an analysis of (illicit) 
capital flight involves assessing the consequences of hypothetically blocking specific financial 
outflows in these circumstances. The important point is that patron-client politics cannot be 
immediately replaced by fiscal politics because these countries are developing economies with a 
limited tax base. Therefore, the fundamental mechanisms through which political entrepreneurs 
gain access to economic resources are unlikely to disappear in the short run in most developing 
countries, with the exception of those that are close to constructing Weberian states. 
                                                 
3 Our intermediate developers should not be confused with middle-income countries. Relatively poor and middle-
income developing countries can both have sustainable political settlements, and both can suffer from internal 
political crises that result in fragility as a result of a collapse in the internal political settlements. 
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Given the nature of political settlements in developing countries, attempting to block financial 
outflows driven by politicians is unlikely to lead to a liberal rule of law because any new ruling 
coalition will also require off-budget resources to maintain political stability and will keep 
resources available for elections (and for their own accumulation). If these resources can be 
expropriated by a new coalition after an election, this can significantly increase the stakes during 
elections. Expropriating the financial resources of former politicians may therefore have the 
paradoxical effect of increasing instability (the case of Thailand after 2006, for example). It can 
increase the intensity with which assets of the current ruling coalition are attacked by the 
opposition, and it can increase the intensity of opposition by excluded coalitions as they attempt 
to protect their assets from expropriation. Indeed, the evidence from stable intermediate 
developers such as Brazil or India suggests that the stability of the political settlement in the 
presence of competition between patron-client parties requires a degree of maturity whereby new 
coalitions understand that it is not in their interest to expropriate the previous coalition fully. An 
informal live-and-let-live rule of law guiding the behavior of political coalitions can reduce the 
costs of losing and allow elections to mature beyond winner takes all contests. However, this 
type of informal understanding is vulnerable. 
 
If the competition between political factions has not achieved a level of maturity that informally 
sets limits on what can be clawed back from a previous ruling coalition, a premature attempt at 
restricting financial flows may have the unintended effect of significantly raising the stakes in 
political conflicts. If the ruling coalition cannot protect some of its assets in other jurisdictions, it 
may feel obliged to use violence or intimidation to stay in power, and this can increase the 
likelihood of eventual expropriation. Paradoxically, some amount of flexibility in politically 
driven financial flows at early stages of state building may help lower the stakes at moments of 
regime change. Thus, restrictions on political financial flows are only likely to improve social 
outcomes if live-and-let-live compromises between political coalitions have already been 
established. For instance, in more stable political settlements such as in Argentina, Brazil, or 
India, a gradual increase on restrictions on financial outflows could lead to better social 
outcomes as long as current politicians feel that the risk of domestic expropriation is low and the 
restrictions simply restrict excessive illegal expropriation by political players.. If formal rules 
restrict political accumulation that is beyond what is normally required to sustain political 
operations in this political settlement, then financial flows that violate these rules can justifiably 
be considered illicit. In contrast, if the informal understanding between competing parties is still 
vulnerable and live-and-let-live arrangements have not become entrenched (as in Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Thailand, and, to an extent, República Bolivariana de Venezuela), attempts to limit 
financial outflows driven by political players are likely to be evaded or, if forcefully enforced, 
can occasionally have damaging consequences in raising the stakes during elections. According 
to our definition, we should not consider all capital outflows by political actors to be illicit in 
these contexts, with critically important policy implications. Clearly, these judgments reflect an 
attempt to take into account direct and indirect effects and are open to a degree of disagreement. 
However, we believe that these judgments have to be made and that they are best made 
explicitly. 
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– Financial outflows driven by economic actors 
Financial outflows driven by economic actors can be motivated by concerns about expropriation 
or low profitability (in addition to tax evasion and tax avoidance). These factors help explain the 
frequent paradox that economic actors in developing countries often shift assets to advanced-
country jurisdictions where tax rates are higher and the returns achieved, say, on bank deposits, 
are nominally lower (Tornell and Velasco 1992). Some of these flows are damaging, and 
blocking them (if that were possible) is likely to leave society more well off. Others are not 
damaging, or, even if they are damaging, attempts to block them would not be positive for 
society after all the direct and indirect effects are weighed. 
 
Financial outflows with net negative effects 
The simplest cases involve capital flight whereby both the direct and indirect effects are 
negative, such as those driven by tax evasion or tax avoidance. The direct effect of these 
outflows is likely to be negative if tax revenue and, with it, public investment is reduced, and, in 
addition, the indirect effect is also likely to be negative if the taxes are socially legitimate and 
their loss undermines political stability. The capital flight in these cases is clearly illicit. Another 
clear-cut case is that of theft of public resources with the collusion of political actors. A 
particularly serious example is the two-way capital flow involved in the odious debt buildup 
resulting if external borrowing by governments is turned, more or less directly, into private asset 
accumulation abroad by domestic residents. Examples include the Philippines and several Sub-
Saharan African economies (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Cerra, Rishi, and Saxena 2008; 
Hermes and Lensink 1992; Vos 1992). Odious debt has no redeeming features, and, if it can be 
blocked, the developing country is likely to be more well off in terms of direct investment 
effects. In normal cases where a political settlement involving powerful domestic constituencies 
exists, theft on this scale by a subset of the ruling coalition is likely to undermine the political 
settlement and have additional negative effects on growth. Blocking these financial outflows is 
therefore likely to have a positive effect on growth through both direct and indirect effects. The 
flows are thus rightly classified as illicit. 
 
Many cases are more complex. Consider a plausible case wherein capital flight is driven by 
attempts to evade environmental restrictions, labor laws, or other socially desirable regulations 
that reduce profits. In principle, these could be welfare-enhancing regulations, and capital flight 
to evade them could be judged illicit. However, a more careful evaluation suggests that the issue 
may vary from case to case. Because developing countries are often competing on narrow 
margins with other developing countries, investors may threaten to leave and begin to transfer 
resources away from a country. What should the policy response be? If social policies in the 
developing country are significantly out of line with competitors, these policies may have made 
the country uncompetitive. Yet, removing all social protections is also not desirable. The real 
issue in this case is coordination in social policy that takes into account differences in initial 
conditions across countries, not an easy task. If such a coordinated policy structure is not 
possible across countries, the enforcement of restrictions on capital flight is unlikely to improve 
growth because domestic investors may become globally uncompetitive. These capital flows 
would therefore not be illicit according to our definition because blocking capital flight without 
deeper policy coordination may fail to improve economic outcomes in a particular country. This 
has important policy implications: all our effort should not be put into trying to block capital 
flight regardless of the underlying causes. Rather, the policy focus should be either to achieve the 
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coordination of social policies across developing countries or, more realistic, to change policies 
such that regulations are aligned across similar countries. 
 
An even more important example concerns policies to overcome major market failures such as 
those constraining technological capabilities. Growth in developing countries is typically 
constrained by low profitability because of the absence of formal and informal policies to 
address market failures and, in particular, the problem of low productivity because of missing 
tacit knowledge about modern production processes (Khan 2009). In the absence of policies that 
assist technological capability development, capital is likely to flow out of the developing 
country despite low wages. Countervailing policies, variously described as technology policies 
or industrial policies, involve the provision of incentives for investors to invest in particular 
sectors and to put in the effort to acquire the missing tacit knowledge. In the presence of such 
policies, some restrictions on capital movements may be potentially beneficial. The provision of 
incentives to invest in difficult processes of technology acquisition and learning may be wasted if 
domestic investors can claim the assistance without delivering domestic capability development. 
Unrestricted financial outflows may allow domestic investors to escape sanctions attached to 
poor performance. If the policy is well designed and the state has the capability to enforce it, 
restrictions on financial outflows may be socially beneficial. Some amount of capital flight may 
still take place, and liberal economists may want to argue that this is a justification for removing 
the policy and returning to a competitive market. However, if the market failures constraining 
investments are significant, this may be the wrong response, if a credible technology policy 
exists. The restrictions on capital flight in East Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s worked 
dramatically because they combined significant incentives for domestic investment with credible 
restrictions on capital flight. In such cases, capital flight would be directly damaging in the sense 
of lost investment and not have any indirect positive effects either. It would therefore be illicit 
according to our definition. 
 
The mirror image of this is capital flight driven by the absence of profitable domestic 
opportunities in a country without effective technology policies. Capital is likely to seek offshore 
investment opportunities. Even if this capital flight appears to be damaging in an immediate 
sense, it may not be. This is because attempting to block capital fleeing low profitability is 
unlikely on its own to solve the deeper problems of growth. Indeed, enforcing restrictions on 
capital outflows in a context of low profitability and absent policies to correct market failures 
could paradoxically make economic performance worse by reducing the incomes of nationals. 
Capital flight in these contexts is not necessarily damaging in terms of direct effects on growth, 
and the indirect effects may also not be negative unless we optimistically believe that blocking 
these flows will force the government into adopting the appropriate policies for tackling market 
failures. Because this is an unlikely scenario, it would be misleading to classify these financial 
outflows as illicit. There is an important policy implication: developing countries need to design 
policies to address low productivity and to absorb new technologies. Attempting to block 
financial outflows without solving these problems will not necessarily improve social outcomes. 
 
A different and even more obvious case is one in which capital flight is induced by the presence 
of bad policies such as the protection of domestic monopolies that disadvantage investors who 
are not politically connected or privileged with monopoly rights. In this situation, if capital 
leaves the country, the direct effects may appear to be damaging in the sense of lost investment, 
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but may not be if domestic investment opportunities are poor. The problem is not the capital 
flight, but the growth-reducing arrangements that induce it. Blocking financial outflows could, in 
an extreme case, lead to the consumption of capital by some investors because profitable 
investment opportunities may be unavailable. The indirect effects of blocking financial outflows 
in this context may also not be positive, and the financial outflow is not usefully described as 
illicit. The appropriate response would be to remove some of the underlying restrictions on 
investment. 
 
Finally, a particularly interesting set of cases concerns financial outflows associated with 
activities that are directly growth-sustaining, but have significant negative effects on a society’s 
political settlement and, therefore, on long-run growth through indirect effects. A classic 
example is the business associated with narcotics and drugs. For many countries, including 
relatively developed countries like Mexico, the income from the production and marketing of 
drugs is a significant contributor to overall economic activity. By some measures, there could be 
a significant positive effect on growth as a direct effect. However, given the legal restrictions on 
the business in many countries, the activity inevitably involves criminality and massive hidden 
rents that disrupt the underlying political settlement of the producing country. The indirect 
negative effects are likely to far outweigh any positive direct effect. It would be quite consistent 
with our definition to describe the financial flows associated with these sectors as illicit. 
 
Financial outflows with positive or neutral effects 
We discuss in passing above a number of examples in which financial outflows do not have a net 
negative effect if both direct and indirect effects are accounted for. In some cases, this can 
involve making difficult judgments that are specific to the context. For instance, in the presence 
of significant market failures facing investors, it may sometimes be useful not to enforce 
restrictions on capital flight too excessively. In textbook models, developing countries lack 
capital and, therefore, capital should flow in if policies are undistorted. In reality, the 
productivity in developing countries is so low that most investments are not profitable, and 
temporary incentives are needed to attract investments (Khan 2009). It is possible that some of 
these incentives have to be made available in other jurisdictions to be credibly secure from 
expropriation. In these contexts, the strict enforcement of restrictions on financial flows may 
reduce the degree of freedom states have in constructing credible incentives for investors taking 
risks in technology absorption and learning. 
 
For example, a significant part of the foreign direct investments in India in the 1980s and 1990s 
came from jurisdictions such as Mauritius. A plausible interpretation is that much of this was 
Indian domestic capital going through Mauritius to come back for reinvestment in India. One 
side of this flow was clearly a hidden financial outflow, the other a transparent inflow in the form 
of foreign direct investment. As a result, the developing country may not be a net capital loser, 
and, indeed, the incentives provided through this arrangement may make new productive 
investment possible in areas where investment may not otherwise have taken place. As in the 
case of odious debt, recycling is also only one side of a two-way flow and is generally assumed 
to be driven by tax and regulatory arbitrage and to be harmful for society (for example, see Kant 
1998, 2002; Schneider 2003b, 2003c). However, in the case of countries with low productivity 
and missing tacit knowledge, the rents captured in this way may, in some situations, serve to 
make investments more attractive and thereby increase net investments. The direct effect may be 
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to promote growth. Recycling through a foreign jurisdiction may also be a mechanism for hiding 
the source of funds in cases in which much of the initial capital base of emerging capitalists has 
involved questionable processes of accumulation that could be challenged by their competitors in 
terms of a formal interpretation of laws. Declaring these flows illicit for the purpose of blocking 
them may be a mistake. The direct effect is likely to be a reduction in investment because these 
types of accumulation may continue to remain hidden or be diverted into criminal activities. The 
expectation of positive indirect effects, for instance by creating disincentives for accumulating 
resources through questionable informal processes, may also be misguided given the structural 
informality in developing countries discussed elsewhere above. These are matters of judgment in 
particular cases. 
 
Sometimes, capital outflows may appear to be illicit simply because they are disallowed by ill-
considered laws that cannot be enforced. If the laws were enforced, society might become even 
less well off. For instance, in some developing countries, vital imports may be illegal for no 
obvious reason, forcing importers to engage in illegal financial transfers to get around the 
restrictions. In many developing countries, remitting foreign exchange out of the country may 
also be disallowed for many purposes, including vitally important ones. An example is the 
widespread practice of illegally remitting foreign exchange from Bangladesh to foreign 
employment agencies that want a commission for arranging overseas employment for 
Bangladeshi workers. If, as a result, domestic workers are able to find employment on better 
terms than in the domestic market, their higher incomes are likely to have a positive effect on 
welfare, and their remittances are likely to support domestic growth. If illegal financial outflows 
involve payments to people smugglers, and most domestic workers end up less well off, the 
direct effects alone would make us classify the financial flows as illicit. A careful analysis is 
required in each case, but, in many cases, the problem may be an inappropriate legal or 
regulatory structure. 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the examples we discuss. Only flows falling in the middle row of 
the table are properly illicit according to our definition. Defining as illicit the other capital flows 
listed may be a policy error even in the case of financial flows in which the direct effect appears 
to be damaging. Nor is the legal-illegal divide of much use in the typical developing-country 
case if the aim is to identify financial flows that need to be blocked to make the developing 
country better off. In any particular country, many financial flows may be simultaneously driven 
by different underlying causes. The judgment that has to be made involves identifying the drivers 
of the most significant financial flows and assessing whether these are damaging in the context 
of the specific political settlement. 
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Table 2.1. Logical Framework for Identifying Illicit Flows from Developing Countries 
 
Net effect Direct effect on growth negative (flow can be legal) 
Direct effect on growth positive or neutral 
(flow can be illegal) 
Net effect 
negative 
(including 
indirect effects): 
this row 
describes illicit 
flows 
Examples: Capital outflows to evade/avoid legitimate 
taxes 
Evasion of restrictions that support an effective 
industrial policy 
Financial outflows of political actors in the presence 
of live-and-let-live agreements. 
Examples: Financial flows associated with the production of drugs 
and narcotics 
Net effect 
positive or 
neutral 
(including 
indirect effects): 
flows in this row 
are not illicit 
even if illegal  
Examples: Financial outflows of political actors in the 
absence of informal agreements restricting 
expropriation 
Examples: Unauthorized payments to overseas agencies to provide 
jobs that are better than domestic opportunities (Bangladesh) 
Recycling that bypasses critical market failures in developing 
economies and increases investment by domestic investors in their 
own country 
Outflows from countries in which profitability is low because of 
absent industrial policy or presence of damaging policies such as 
protection for domestic monopolies 
Source: Author compilation. 
 
 
4. Developing countries in crisis: the fragile developers 
 
Fragile developing countries are ones in which the internal political settlement is close to 
collapsing or has collapsed, and political factions are engaged in violent conflict. This group 
includes, for example, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. It also 
includes a number of other developing countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Central Asia in which political settlements are highly vulnerable 
to collapse in the near future. IFFs may appear to be at the heart of their fragility and, indeed, 
may be fueling conflicts. However, we argue that it is difficult to define what is illicit in such a 
context of conflict. Fundamental disagreements about the distribution of benefits are unlikely to 
be resolved without recourse to systemic violence. 
 
Violence is, nonetheless, not the distinctive feature of fragile countries; there may also be 
pockets of intense violence in intermediate developers such as Bolivia, Brazil, India, or Thailand. 
Rather, fragile countries are characterized by a significant breakdown of the political settlement 
and, in extreme cases, also of social order. While pockets of rudimentary social order may 
spontaneously emerge in such societies, this is largely limited to the organization of violence and 
subnational economies supporting the economy of violence. There is a grey area between 
intermediate developers facing growing internal conflicts and a developing country classified as 
fragile. Nonetheless, in intermediate developers, while a few political groups and factions may 
be engaging in significant violence, most significant political factions are engaged in the normal 
patron-client politics of rent seeking and redistribution using the formal and informal 
mechanisms through which political settlements are constructed in these countries. A political 
settlement is possible because there is a viable distribution of resources across the most powerful 
groups that reflects their relative power and that can be reproduced over time. This is a necessary 
condition describing a sustainable end to significant violence and the emergence of a political 
settlement. 
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The defining characteristic of fragility is that a sustainable balance of power and a corresponding 
distribution of benefits across powerful political actors have not emerged. Violence is the process 
through which contending groups are attempting to establish and test the distribution of power on 
which a future political settlement could emerge. But this may take a long time because the 
assessment by different groups of what they can achieve may be unrealistic, and some groups 
may believe that, by fighting long enough, they can militarily or even physically wipe out the 
opposition. In some cases, this belief may be realistic (Sri Lanka in 2010); in other cases, the 
attempt to wipe out the opposition can result in a bloody stalemate until negotiations about a 
different distribution of benefits can begin (perhaps Afghanistan in 2010). The analysis of what 
is socially damaging needs to be fundamentally reevaluated and redefined in these contexts, and 
this has implications for our assessment of illicit flows. 
 
The historical examples tell us that apparently predatory resource extraction has been the 
precursor of the emergence of viable political settlements that have generated longer-term social 
order and viable states (Tilly 1985, 1990). Yet, in contemporary fragile societies, new 
circumstances make it less likely that conflicts will result in the evolution of relationships 
between organizers of violence and their constituents that resemble state building. First, natural 
resources can give organizers of violence in some societies access to previously unimaginable 
amounts of purchasing power, destroying incentives for internal coalition building with 
economic constituents in the sense described by Tilly. Second, the presence of advanced 
countries that manufacture sophisticated weapons and can pump in vast quantities of resources in 
the form of military assistance or aid also changes the incentives of domestic organizers of 
violence. Instead of having to recognize internal distributions of power and promote productive 
capabilities, these people recognize that the chances of winning now depend at least partly on 
international alliances and the ability to play along with donor discourses. Domestic organizers 
who try to fight wars by taxing their constituents in sustainable ways are likely to be annihilated 
by opponents who focus on acquiring foreign friends. 
 
These considerations should give us serious cause for concern in talking about IFFs in these 
contexts in which the indirect effects of financial flows through the promotion or destruction of 
political stability are likely to far outweigh the direct effects on growth. By its nature the 
construction of politically stable settlement involves winners and losers: strategies of state or 
polity formation are not neutral in any sense. 
 
The terminology of illicit flows in these contexts should preferably be avoided, or its use should 
be restricted to financial flows that are illicit explicitly from the perspective of the observer. For 
instance, the flow of narcotics incomes, grey or black market transactions in the global arms 
market, or sales of natural resources by warlords may go against the legitimate interests of 
outsiders, and they are entitled to declare the associated financial flows as illicit from the 
perspective of their interests. This is justifiable if these flows are causing damage to the interests 
of other countries. 
 
We should not, however, pretend that blocking particular flows is in any way neutral or 
necessarily beneficial for the construction of viable political settlements, because there are likely 
to be many possible settlements that different groups are trying to impose. Moreover, competing 
groups of outsiders are also likely to be providing aid, guns, and, sometimes, their own troops to 
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their clients within the country. There is no easy way to claim that some of these resource flows 
are legitimate and constructive and others are not without exposing significant political partiality 
toward particular groups. 
 
The real problem is that we do not know the outcomes of these conflicts, and the internal 
distribution of power is both unstable and changing. Because the sustainability of the eventual 
sociopolitical order that may appear depends on the emergence of a sustainable distribution of 
power among the key groups engaged in conflict, we cannot properly identify ex ante the 
resource flows that are consistent with a sustainable political settlement. The resource flows are 
likely to help determine the political settlement as much as sustain it. 
 
It follows that the analysis and identification of illicit capital flows must be different across 
intermediate developers and across fragile developers. Fragile societies typically do not have 
internationally competitive sectors in their economies, nor do their competing leaders have the 
capacity to encourage productive sectors effectively. The adverse conditions created by conflict 
mean that significant countervailing policies would have to be adopted to encourage productive 
investment in these contexts. Though this is not impossible, as the example of the Palestinian 
Authority in the five years immediately following the Oslo Accords shows (Khan 2004), the 
likely direct growth effect of particular financial flows is a moot question in most cases of 
fragility. 
 
Globally competitive economic activities do take place in many conflicts, but these are of a 
different nature from the development of technological and entrepreneurial skills with which 
intermediate developers have to grapple. One example is natural resource extraction that is a 
special type of economic activity because it does not require much domestic technical and 
entrepreneurial capability. The returns may be large enough for some foreign investments or for 
extraction based on artisanal technologies even in war zones. A similar argument applies to the 
cultivation of plants associated with the manufacture of narcotics. The financial flows from these 
activities are likely to be directly controlled by political actors and may provide the funds for 
sustaining the conflict. The only type of capital flight that is likely to emanate directly from the 
decisions of economic actors is the obvious one of attempting to escape destruction or 
appropriation. But if individuals try to move their assets out of a war zone to avoid expropriation, 
it would be unhelpful to characterize these as illicit. 
 
Of most concern in fragile societies are the flows organized by political actors, as these are 
bound to be connected with ongoing conflicts in some way. In the case of intermediate 
developers, our concern is that, under some conditions, restrictions on financial flows may 
inadvertently increase the stakes for holding on to power. A similar, but obviously more serious 
set of uncertainties affects the analysis of conflicts. In theory, if all parties to a conflict were 
blocked from accessing the outside world, this may have a positive effect in forcing them to 
recognize the existing distribution of power and reaching a compromise more quickly than 
otherwise. In the real world, a total sealing off is unlikely. Some parties to the conflict are likely 
to be recognized by outside powers as legitimate well before an internal political settlement has 
been arrived at and receive financial and military assistance. 
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Two entirely different outcomes may follow. The less likely is that the groups excluded by the 
international community recognize the hopelessness of their situation and either capitulate or 
agree to the settlement that is offered. A more likely outcome, as in Afghanistan, is that external 
assistance to help one side while attempting to block resource flows to the other by declaring 
these to be unauthorized or illicit can increase the local legitimacy of the opposition and help to 
intensify the conflict. In the end, every group is likely to find some external allies and ways to 
funnel resources to fight a conflict where the stakes are high. Paradoxically, finding new foreign 
allies becomes easier if the enhanced legitimacy of the excluded side makes it more likely that 
they will win. These considerations suggest that a neutral way of defining IFFs is particularly 
difficult, perhaps impossible, in the case of fragile developers. Table 2.2 summarizes our 
analysis in this section. 
 
Table 2.2. Illicit Financial Flows in Different Contexts 
 
Country type Defining features Main policy concern Main types of illicit capital flows Policy focus in addressing illicit capital flows 
Advanced 
economies 
High average incomes and long-
term political stability. Political 
process responds effectively to 
economic underperformance and 
distributive concerns. 
Laws and fiscal 
programs should 
maintain social cohesion 
and economic growth. 
Mainly flows that violate existing 
laws (for example, tax evasion). 
Occasionally refer to legal flows 
where laws no longer reflect social 
consensus or economic sustainability. 
Strengthen enforcement and regulation. At 
moments of crisis, attempt to bring law back 
into line with broad social consensus on 
economic and political goals. 
Intermediate 
or normal 
developers 
Lower average incomes, and 
politics based on a combination 
of formal and informal (patron-
client) redistributive 
arrangements. Achieves long-
term stability without sustained 
violence. 
Develop, maintain, and 
expand viable 
development strategies, 
in particular the 
development of 
broadbased productive 
sectors. 
Flows that undermine developmental 
strategies. Capital flight in a context 
of a failure to raise domestic 
profitability is problematic, but is not 
necessarily illicit. Flows associated 
with internationally criminalized 
activities like drugs. 
Economic policies to enhance profitability 
primarily by addressing critical market 
failures. Build governance capabilities to 
enforce restrictions on financial flows that 
make these policies less vulnerable to 
political contestation. 
Fragile 
developing 
countries 
Breakdown of existing political 
settlements resulting in the 
outbreak of sustained violence 
that undermines longer-term 
conditions for the maintenance 
of basic sociopolitical order. 
State building and 
reconstruction of a 
viable political 
settlement to allow 
society to embark on a 
sustainable path of 
economic development. 
Not possible to define illicit flows in 
a neutral way when elites are in 
conflict. The effects of financial 
flows have to be judged primarily in 
terms of their effects on the 
establishment of a particular political 
settlement. 
A viable political settlement requires 
competing groups to accept a distribution of 
benefits consistent with their understanding 
of their relative power. Difficult for outsiders 
to contribute positively and easy to prolong 
conflicts inadvertently. 
Source: Author compilation. 
 
5. Policy Responses to Illicit Flows 
 
Our discussion above suggests that capital outflows from developing countries qualify as illicit 
according to our definition if they have a negative economic impact on a particular country after 
we take both direct and indirect effects into account in the context of a specific political 
settlement. Both judgments about effects are counterfactual in the sense that we are asking what 
would directly happen to growth if a particular flow could be blocked, and then we are asking 
what would happen after the indirect effects arising from adjustments by critical stakeholders to 
the new situation have taken place. The latter assessment depends on our knowledge about the 
economy and polity of the society as summarized in the political settlement. This methodology 
allows us to derive some useful policy conclusions in the case of intermediate developers. By 
contrast, the use of the illicit flow terminology involves significant dangers in the case of fragile 
countries. Policy makers should at least be explicitly aware of this. 
 
In this section, we discuss a sequential approach for the identification of feasible policy 
interventions to address illicit capital outflows that satisfy our definition and that occur in 
intermediate developers. 
 
27 
 
Assume that a particular capital outflow from an intermediate developer is illicit according to our 
definition. The core policy concern here is a microlevel assessment of how any particular set of 
measures to restrict the illicit capital outflow affects the macrodynamics of the economy and 
society in question. While our assessment about the nature of an illicit flow has taken into 
account the indirect effects of blocking the flow, the implementation of any policy almost always 
gives rise to unintended consequences, and all the indirect effects may not be understood. More 
often than not, policy failure is the failure to take such unintended consequences into account ex 
ante. 
 
An illustration of such unintended consequences, in this case pertaining to the international 
regulation of financial flows, is provided by Gapper’s analysis (2009) of the Basel Accords I 
(1998) and II (2004), which were designed to regulate global banks essentially by setting higher 
capital adequacy standards and improving the measurement of leverage. Ironically, these 
standards inadvertently accelerated rather than muted financial engineering by banks, in 
particular the securitization of risky mortgage debts. The accords raised the threshold of 
responsible banking, but simultaneously created incentives to find a way around the thresholds 
that would prove more disastrous to the global economy. As Gapper remarks (2009, 1), “it would 
be wrong to throw away the entire Basel framework . . . because global banks found ways to 
game the system.” The obvious implication is that one must strengthen rather than throw away 
existing regulations. 
 
More generally, in our view, an effective policy response to illicit flows requires a step-by-step, 
sequential assessment of the macrolevel effects of blocking particular capital flows. To illustrate 
what this entails in the case of an intermediate developer, consider the example provided by 
Gulati (1987) and Gordon Nembhard’s analysis (1996) of industrialization policies in Brazil and 
the Republic of Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s. Both authors argue that trade misinvoicing in 
these countries during this period followed an unusual pattern in that imports tended to be 
underinvoiced. Both authors explain this in terms of domestic producers and traders, “rather than 
being preoccupied with evading controls to earn foreign exchange, may be more concerned about 
meeting export and production targets and maximizing government plans” (Gordon Nembhard 
1996, 187). In these two countries (but not necessarily in others), there were potentially 
avoidable losses from trade misinvoicing, and these flows were therefore illicit. Nonetheless, the 
losses were significantly smaller than the gains from the incentives created for higher 
investments in sectors promoted by the industrial policy. To decide whether or not to block illicit 
trade misinvoicing in these circumstances (and, if so, how), the most important aspect of policy 
design is to prepare a microlevel analysis of the impact of different ways of blocking these flows 
on the overall economy. This analysis has to take account of economic and political 
circumstances and the likely impact of particular regulatory strategies. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
iterative process required to arrive at policy decisions that avoid unintended negative 
consequences. 
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Figure 2.2. Choosing Attainable Benchmarks for Policy Design 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
 
 
Assume that the policy intervention from stage 1 to stage 2 in figure 2.2 introduces an industrial 
policy regime to promote manufacturing exports. This, in turn, provides incentives for some 
illicit practices, giving rise to stage 3. Despite the presence of the illicit practices arising from the 
implementation of the industrial policy introduced in stage 2, the overall development outcome 
at stage 3 is reasonably good. There are several possible responses to the observation of illicit 
practices at stage 3. One option is to abandon the export promoting industrial policies on the 
grounds that these create the incentive to underinvoice imports. This would be in line with the 
portfolio approach to capital flight that adopts competitive markets as the benchmark model. 
However, if critical market failures were significant to start with, developmental outcomes at 
position 1 may be worse than at position 3. Hence, an immediate response to the illicit flow 
problem at stage 3 that does not take account of developmental problems at stage 1 may be self-
defeating. Indeed, in terms of our definitions, the financial flows at position 3 are not illicit with 
respect to position 1, though they are illicit with respect to position 2. 
 
An obvious option would be to run a more efficient customs administration to raise the 
transaction costs of import underinvoicing, ideally to the point at which this becomes 
unprofitable. This is the preferable policy option: it could shift the policy framework from 
position 3 to position 4. The result would be a reduction in underinvoicing that then takes us to 
position 5, a combination of the new policy framework and a new (reduced) level of illicit flows. 
The developmental outcomes at stage 5 would be better than those at stage 3, and, so, this 
response to the illicit flow problem would be entirely justified. Yet, to get from position 3 to 
position 5 requires a careful microlevel analysis of the costs and benefits of different policies. If 
import underinvoicing and the illicit profits associated with it could be eliminated without 
jeopardizing the participation of private sector firms in the export promotion program, the policy 
of better enforcement would be effective and economically justified. 
 
In contrast, consider the case (such as Brazil in the 1970s rather than Korea) in which tolerating 
some import underinvoicing is an informal incentive to ensure private sector participation in a 
growth-enhancing export promotion program. If the extra incomes from this source are important 
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to ensuring private sector participation in the policy, an attempt to remove these rents could 
inadvertently result in more damaging rent seeking by the private sector or the sector’s political 
refusal to participate in industrial policy programs. If either happened, the economy would be 
less well off and could revert to the less preferable position at stage 1. This assessment would 
depend on our understanding of the political settlement and the power of the private sector to 
resist the imposition of policies that the sector perceives to be against its interests. The attempt to 
control the illicit flows would then have failed in a developmental sense even if the illicit flows 
disappeared. The core policy task in this case would not be to block the illicit capital flows 
associated with stage 3 (import underinvoicing), but to support the creation of state capacities 
and an adjustment of the political settlement that would allow the effective implementation of 
efficient customs administration in the future without reliance on informal perks such as import 
underinvoicing. More generally, this suggests that a careful sequential microanalysis of the 
macro-outcomes of blocking particular illicit capital flows is required, locating particular 
strategies in the context of specific initial conditions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our core concern has been to show that what constitutes an illicit capital outflow can vary across 
countries, depending on the core political and economic features. The number of capital outflows 
that are unequivocally illicit in our minimal definition is likely to be more limited than the 
number that might be defined as such in single-driver approaches based on questionable 
underlying economic models. Quantitative estimates of illicit flows using our definition are 
therefore likely to be considerably less spectacular than, for example, recent estimates of dirty 
money (see Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008). This is precisely our point. We argue that, if 
economic development is to be the main concern in this debate, then the promotion of economic 
growth in the context of a distribution of benefits that is politically viable has to be the condition 
that any policy intervention must meet. Wider criteria than this to define illicit capital outflows 
as a target for policy intervention by necessity rely on some broader notion of the social or 
economic good based on an abstract underlying model that may have little relevance in seeking 
development in the real world. 
 
Our analysis also questions the validity of a core premise of the capital flight literature, namely, 
that all flight capital, if retained domestically, will yield a higher social rate of return (Schneider 
2003a; Cumby and Levich 1987; Walter 1987). The purpose of our analytical typology is to 
show that, from the point of view of economic and political development, blocking all capital 
outflows from developing countries is not desirable. Moreover, as we outline in table 2.1, 
blocking some apparently damaging flows can also do more harm than good if these flows are 
driven by deeper problems (such as the absence of industrial policy, live-and-let-live rules 
between competing political factions, or the presence of domestic monopolies). In these cases, 
we argue, it is a mistake to describe the resultant flows as illicit. The policy implication is not 
that nothing should be done in such cases. It is rather that the solution is to look for policies that 
address the underlying structural problems. In the case of fragile developers, our analysis points 
out the dangers of too easily defining what is illicit. Finally, our sequential impact assessment 
suggests that there are dangers even in simplistically attacking capital flows that we do deem 
illicit. Even in these cases, it is possible that some policy responses are more effective than 
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others, and policies that tackle illicit capital flows in isolation from the wider political 
settlements of which they are a part may leave society less well off. 
 
Consider the following example on anti–money laundering (AML) policies. The cost-
effectiveness of the AML regime promoted by the intergovernmental Financial Action Task 
Force is doubtful even for advanced economies (Reuter and Truman 2004; Schneider 2005).4
 
 
Sharman (2008) extends this analysis to developing countries, with a special focus on Barbados, 
Mauritius, and Vanuatu, and finds that AML standards have had a significant net negative impact 
on these three developing countries. Essentially, the costs imposed on legitimate businesses and 
states having limited administrative and financial capacity far outweighed the extremely limited 
benefits in terms of convictions or the recovery of illicit assets. Yet, according to Sharman, rather 
than rethinking the policy model, its enforcement was strengthened mainly by blacklisting 
noncompliant countries and through competition between states for international recognition and 
imitation. 
Sharman (2008, 651) highlights the case of Malawi, as follows: 
Malawi is not and does not aspire to be an international financial center, nor has it been 
associated with money laundering or the financing of terrorism. Speaking at an international 
financial summit in September 2006, the Minister of Economics and Planning recounted how 
his country had come to adopt the standard package of AML regulations. The Minister was 
told that Malawi needed an AML policy. The Minister replied that Malawi did not have a 
problem with money laundering, but was informed that this did not matter. When the 
Minister asked if the package could be adapted for local conditions he was told no, because 
then Malawi would not meet international standards in this area. The Minister was further 
informed that a failure to meet international AML standards would make it harder for 
individuals and firms in Malawi to transact with the outside world relative to its neighbors, 
and thus less likely to attract foreign investment. The Minister concluded: “We did as we 
were told.” 
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